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Technological Innovation and Finance1 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the relationship between technological innovation and finance. The financial mar-
ket must be regarded as one of the fundamental prerequisite of innovation, inasmuch as it is here that 
decisions are made on capital allocation to enterprises. However, less has been written on the interde-
pendencies between the patterns of corporate finance and governance on the one hand and company 
innovation strategies on the other hand. The paper takes up these open questions. It analyses the 
transformation process of the German innovation system due to the dynamics of the financial market in 
the last decades. In conclusion, some general insight into the relationship between finance and innova-
tion beyond the German context will be provided. The paper is based on an extensive literature re-
search in the fields of economic sociology and innovation studies and the analysis of the public debate 
on the prospects of the current economic development. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Gegenstand des Papiers ist der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Verlauf technologischer Innovationen 
und den Bedingungen ihrer Finanzierung. Ausgangspunkt der Argumentation ist, dass die Bedingungen 
des Finanzmarktes als eine der zentralen Voraussetzungen für Innovationen anzusehen ist, da auf die-
ser Ebene über die Modi der Finanzierung von Investitionen und von Unternehmen entschieden wird. 
Im Feld der sozialwissenschaftlichen Innovationsforschung wurde bislang dieses Thema jedoch sehr 
stiefmütterlich behandelt. Der Zusammenhang zwischen den Modi der Unternehmensfinanzierung und 
Unternehmenskontrolle einerseits und Innovationsstrategien von Unternehmen andererseits wurde bis-
lang kaum untersucht. Das vorliegende Papier greift diesen Zusammenhang auf. Analysiert wird der 
Entwicklungsprozess des deutschen Innovationssystems im Kontext des Prozesses der Globalisierung 
des Finanzmarktes. Darüber hinaus zielt die Argumentation auf einige weitergehende konzeptionelle 
Überlegungen zu den Interdependenzen zwischen Finanzmarkt und Innovation. Die Argumentation ba-
siert auf einer intensiven Literaturrecherche in den Feldern der ökonomischen und sozialwissenschaftli-
chen Innovationsforschung und einer Analyse der öffentlichen Debatte über die ökonomischen und 
technologischen Entwicklungsperspektiven. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the relationship between the structures and development of financial market and 
the course of technological innovations. Therewith it delves into the interaction between central struc-
tural characteristics and development moments of capitalist societies, an aspect which has so far been 
analysed only marginally in the social theory debate on the dynamics and transformation of capitalism 
as well as in socioscientific innovation research (cf. O’Sullivan, 2005; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008).  
The socioscientific debate emphasises that the course and the scope of technological innovations corre-
late with the given social-institutional conditions. This is instructively shown by innovation studies that 
examine different kinds of innovation systems from the perspective of institution theory. The key idea 
here is that the different social-institutional arrangements, which vary not only in the different countries 
but also in sectors and regions, shape the process of technological innovations. In this context, the con-
cept of “national innovation systems“ with its many variations has gained particular scientific and politi-
cal prominence (cf. Lundvall, 1992, 2007; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 2005). This research points to the sig-
nificance of institutional factors such as the scientific system, the educational system and the labour 
market, industrial relations and the financial sector, which in the interplay with the structures and strate-
gies of relevant organisations (in particular of enterprises) shape the focus areas and process of innova-
tion.  
These studies reveal the interplay of all of the institutional factors that shapes an innovation system and 
the therein embedded corporate strategies. Furthermore, the literature points to the fact that the finan-
cial market must be regarded as a fundamental structural condition of the capitalist method of produc-
tion and innovation, inasmuch as it is here that decisions are made on capital allocation to enterprises.2 
As is shown not only by international comparative studies on systems of innovation but also by eco-
nomic history studies (e.g. Gerschenkron, 1962; Zysman, 1983; Deeg and Jackson, 2007), the different 
conditions of the financial market decisively shape “the logic of the whole political economy“ (Lane, 
2003: 80). More specifically, the different financial market conditions entail different forms of corporate 
financing, specific patterns of the system of corporate governance as well as divergent latitudes for en-
terprise strategies.3  
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2  The term “financial market” is used to subsume the different subsectors of debt and equity financing of private and pub-
lic investments. The stock markets with their influential actors, such as investment funds, analysts and rating agents, 
are considered to be the steering centres (cf. Huffschmid, 1999; Windolf, 2005).  
3  The term “system of corporate governance“ is here taken to mean the complex of structures, interests and practices 
which governs and controls the enterprises and their strategies; basically this refers to the prevailing ownership struc-
tures and the associated entrepreneurial objectives as well as the rules of decision-making in corporate management 
(cf. Lorsch and Graff, 2001).  
 
  
 
However, less has been written on the interdependencies between the patterns of corporate finance 
and governance on the one hand and company innovation strategies on the other hand: A few studies 
were conducted with an international and historical comparative perspective. Particular mention must be 
made of the extensive international comparative studies of Andrew Tylecote, Paulina Ramirez et al., in 
which the consequences of the differences between the innovation systems of various countries were 
systematically analysed (cf. Tylecote and Conesa, 1999; Tylecote and Ramirez 2006). In a broadly 
based study, Tylecote and Visintin (2008) examine how systems of corporate governance and finance 
vary in different nations and how these variations affect the technological performances of these na-
tions. However, this international comparative analysis provides few insights into current trends and fu-
ture prospects of the divergent systems. William Lazonick (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 1996; Lazonick, 
2003, 2007) delves into the connection between the (likewise) Anglo-Saxon financial market conditions 
and the structural characteristics of innovative enterprises particularly with regard to innovations in high-
tech sectors. This author explicitly formulated the hypothesis that the internationally more and more 
dominating American shareholder-oriented financial market conditions retard rather than promote inno-
vations.  
The developmental perspectives of the financial markets have been more explicitly discussed in several 
papers by economists. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) as well as Brown and Petersen (2009) in particu-
lar focus on the role of equity markets as one major pillar of the financial system which has emerged 
during the last decades. From this perspective, the authors point to the changing environment for inno-
vation financing and explain country-specific differences. However, they mainly focus on the conse-
quences for high-tech innovations in the American innovation system. Only the paper by Rajan and Zin-
gales (2003) pursues a broader comparative perspective and does not only analyse the development in 
the U.S. but also in several European countries. Its findings indicate that since the 1980s the European 
financial markets show more and more similarities to the capital markets in the USA. And, it is shown 
that the American capital market-oriented system gives new firms attempting new technologies a better 
chance of obtaining financing than European bank-dominated systems. 
The following argumentation takes up these debates and open questions. It starts with a brief summary 
of the various country-specific patterns of interdependencies between finance and innovation outlined in 
the aforementioned studies. These country-specific patterns are taken as reference point for the next 
steps of the argumentation: On the basis of these traditional patterns, the developmental dynamics of 
the relationship between finance and innovation in the course of the internationalisation of the financial 
markets will be analysed in three steps. Firstly, the underlying mechanisms of the dynamics of the fi-
nancial markets will be outlined by referring to the ongoing debate on the emerging “financial market 
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capitalism” in economic sociology (cf. Windolf, 2005). Secondly, the consequences of this change proc-
ess will be analysed with regard to the development of the German innovation system. Germany is of 
great importance in this respect as its system of corporate finance has been subject to substantial trans-
formation processes in the last two decades. The paper will conclude with some general insights into 
the relationship between finance and innovation beyond the German context. 
The following argumentation is based on extensive literature research in the fields of economic sociol-
ogy and innovation studies and on the analysis of the public debate on the prospects of the current eco-
nomic development. Therefore, the paper does not present final research findings but rather puts reflec-
tions from research in progress up for discussion. 
2. Relations between finance and innovation 
The term ‘innovation’ is taken to denote technological innovations, i.e the genesis, development and 
diffusion of new marketable products, services and techno-organisational processes. Well known char-
acteristics of technological innovations are the uncertainty with regard to the attainable technical and 
economic success, the risks of the usually fairly unpredictable course of the innovation process with its 
ex ante almost incalculable intermediate steps and unexpectedly arising decision-making situations and, 
finally, the difficulty to predict innovation costs. These features entail specific requirements regarding 
their financing: In a nutshell: ”Innovation is an expensive process; significant resources must be ex-
pended to initiate, direct and sustain it. It is a process that takes time, which means that the resources 
that support it must be committed until the process is complete. Finally, its outcomes are uncertain so 
the returns to innovative investments are not assured.” (O’Sullivan, 2005: 240) Furthermore, as eco-
nomic theory stresses, there is often a high degree of information asymmetry between the financier and 
the innovator which may lead to opportunistic action on the side if the innovator and adverse risk selec-
tion on the side of the financiers. Because normally the innovator has a better understanding of the op-
portunities, risks and uncertainties of an innovation process than the external financier (cf. Rammer, 
2009). Therefore, according to Giovanni Dosi, the financier of innovation always needs “…some sort of 
heroic trust in unexplored opportunities.” In other words, a financial system must allow for the possibility 
of numerous gambles on unexplored opportunities, about which little is known ex ante, but which can 
reasonably be expected to be, on average, failures (Dosi, 1990: 307). 
Due to the different social-institutional conditions the financing problem of innovation is solved in differ-
ent country and time-specific ways. To analyse this in an international comparative perspective one can 
refer to the well -known differentiation between “insider-dominated” and “outsider-dominated” financial 
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systems (cf. Franks and Mayer, 1997). Based on this approach (cf. in particular Rajan and Zingales, 
2003; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008) the following country-specific conditions become apparent:4 
a) Insider-dominated system 
The German innovation pattern with its sophisticated incremental innovations is seen to be linked to an 
institutional context of a system of networked corporate governance dominated by universal banks and 
industrial cross ownership (cf. Streeck, 1991). In the literature on finance and innovation, this system is 
generally referred to as “insider-dominated“ (Mayer, 2002; Tylecote and Visintin, 2008) or “relationship-
based“ (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). According to Tylecote and Visintin, this type comprised all non-
English speaking countries until at least the 1990s most notably due to the concentrated ownership of 
debt and equity and a dominating consensus-seeking culture between the different groups involved in 
the governance of a company. Taking into account the role of employees and the strong influences of 
co-determination on corporate governance in Germany, they regard the German situation as a specific 
subtype of the insider-dominated system, viz as “stakeholder-system” (Tylecote and Visintin, 2008: 64). 
A dominating consensus-seeking culture between the different groups involved in the governance of a 
company is being regarded as a general feature of this German system. Concerning the typical mode of 
financing, the authors speak of “relational banking”: Typical of this type is a high degree of enterprise-
oriented commitment of the banks and external capital providers and their relatively detailed knowledge 
of the situation and the activities of the enterprises they finance; in other words, they show a “firm-
specific understanding” (ibid.: 83). Concerning innovation activities, lasting learning processes between 
the involved actors from inside and outside a company are characteristic for this system and also the 
fact that the role of external investors is based on “participation” and “voice” (Dosi, 1990). The funding of 
innovation is characterised by a broad spectrum of features: On the one hand, a main feature of the 
German system is that external financing of innovation is less acceptable for the companies and it is 
less available than in other countries (cf. Ramer, 2009). Particularly the owners of family-controlled firms 
very often refuse a real stock exchange listing of their companies for fear of loosing control. This holds 
for the huge amount of unlisted firms in Germany which can be assumed to be mostly family controlled; 
as is known unlisted firms are much more important in Germany than in other countries.5 But this may 
also hold for a certain percentage of publicly-traded German firms because many of them are family-
controlled. Referring to data summarized by Tylecote and Visintin (2008: 78) for the late 1990ies 64,6% 
                                                 
4  The fact that in a historical perspective various forms of solutions for the financing problems of innovations were found 
within the different national contexts is for the moment neglected here. On the long-term development in the US, see, 
for example, the research study of Perez (2002) and the bibliography in O’Sullivan (2005); for a differentiated analysis 
see Block (2002). 
5  Cf. Tylecote and Visintin (2008: 77) who present figures for the low stock market capitalisation in Germany compared 
to the U.S.A. and Japan for the second half of the 1990ies. 
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of publicly-traded firms in Germany are family-controlled, in contrast to e.g. UK with a resp. percentage 
of 23,7%. 
On the other hand, the dominant means of financing of firms and thus of innovations are external re-
sources, namely the loan from the firm’s bank. This holds true in particular for medium-sized and family-
owned companies (“Mittelstand”) because of their limited equity (Vieweg, 2001). Hence a specific form 
of economic rationality results: It is not in the interest of the lending banks that their debtors, i.e. the en-
terprises, pursue short-term strategies of profit maximisation and thus take risks regarding their long-
term existence; if these are avoided, the repayment of the loans and the profits of the creditor banks are 
assured. Paul Windolf (2005: 22) describes this as follows: “The loans of the banks were patient, con-
trolling and risk-averse capital“.  
With regard to innovation processes, this implicates a strong and long-term commitment of external 
capital providers to an innovating company on the basis of a relatively exact knowledge of the proc-
esses that have to be financed. This also implicates that the investors‘ access to the free cash flow of 
the companies is limited. In other words, the management can dispose of internal funds for innovation 
decisions. Consequently, innovation with a long-term perspective proceed incrementally along fairly es-
tablished technological trajectories, as the accumulated skills of the involved actors and the well-oiled 
organisational routines in the context of the long-term oriented relations are prejudicial to radical innova-
tions and their risks and uncertainties. In this regard, firms that work on radical innovation are at a dis-
advantage because, given these financing modalities, the availability of risk-oriented venture capital for 
such innovation strategies is limited (e.g. Caspar et al., 1999).  
b) Outsider-dominated system 
In contrast, the prominence of high-tech-oriented radical innovations, typical for instance for the US, is 
seen in close conjunction with market-regulated financing conditions. The basis here is capital market 
financing, the central instrument is the share which goes hand in hand with a high degree of flexibility 
and willingness to take risks. With respect to concrete innovation patterns, however, one must differen-
tiate between two segments of the financing system: The one segment is based on a financing system, 
in which the economic objectives of the firms and their investors centre on a short-term profit maximisa-
tion and on an as high as possible share price. The main players of the financial market in this respect 
are pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and the “asset management houses“, which 
manage investment portfolios. These organisations are likely to own shares in several firms of a sector, 
and thus to have a general understanding of the sector as a whole as a precondition for their investment 
decisions. An important role is also played by private equity firms which invest in large control-oriented 
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equity stakes on behalf of other financial institutions such as pension funds (Tylecote and Ramirez, 
2005: 12).  
Generally, this mode of financing is characterised by a loose relationship between investors and individ-
ual enterprises; a few specialised long-term oriented private equity funds are the exception. Normally, 
successful corporate financing hinges upon the public proof of the profitability of the company activities. 
The basis for this are – frequently standardised – cost accounting methods which abstract from the con-
crete context of a company and its activities. Therefore this form of corporate financing and of corporate 
governance is labelled “outsider-dominated“ system. Its “arms-length relationships“ are also character-
ised by a high pressure for shareholder value (Tylecote and Visintin, 2008: 92). With regard to innova-
tion processes, this implicates a loose commitment of external capital providers to an innovating com-
pany on the basis of a low company-specific expertise. The strategies of the investors are seen as se-
lection processes based on “entry” and “exit-mechanisms” (Dosi, 1990). Tylecote and Ramirez summa-
rise the consequences for innovation strategies as follows: “…R&D intensity will not be a positive func-
tion of pressure for shareholder value, but rather a negative one,…shareholders who do not understand 
the value of spending on innovation…will impose short-term pressure which discourage it.” And they go 
on to say: “Moreover, innovation which promises a return somewhat less than the cost of capital will 
certainly be discouraged by pressure for shareholder value – whereas a management free of such 
pressure will favour it…” (Tylecote and Ramirez, 2005: 27). Innovations in established firms therefore 
usually proceed with a short-term orientation, aim at rapid economic successes and develop the avail-
able technologies at a very slow pace. Evidence for this is the decades-long dominance of traditional 
manufacturing technologies in the U.S. (cf. Hirsch-Kreinsen, 1992) and the non- advanced automotive 
technology of American automotive manufacturers. 
The prominence of high-tech oriented radical innovations in this innovation system can primarily be put 
down to the existence of a second, institutionalised segment of the financial market for risk and innova-
tion-oriented venture capital. The driving power is the high availability of risk-oriented capital. Venture 
capital can be regarded as a subset of private equity that is invested in new or young firms in high 
growth mode, usually high-technology sectors pursuing risky innovation strategies. In the U.S., venture 
capital is basically responsible for the remarkable rise in the proportion of R&D performed by firms with 
less than 500 employees, with an increase from 5.9% in 1984 to 20.7% in 2003 (Tylecote and Ramirez, 
2005: 14). This segment of the financial market plays an important role in financing high-risk innovation 
strategies fraught with uncertainties (Dosi, 1990). The providers of venture capital are characterised by 
their high willingness to take risks in conjunction with a detailed knowledge of the innovation project. 
Hence, venture capitalists expect to participate in company management as well as in finance and there 
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is a close relationship between investor and the innovating company. In other words, the strategies of 
the capital providers are based on “voice-mechanisms” and less on “entry/exit-mechanisms” of pure 
selection. Of course this segment is linked to the “outsider-dominated“-segment of corporate financing 
in specific ways: For one thing, venture capital normally finances the particularly risky early phases of 
an innovation which the majority of investors shun. For another thing, venture capitalists ultimately aim 
at selling their interest in firms with successful radical innovations at a high profit. A precondition for this 
are the market processes of an “outsider-dominated“ financial market as well as the possibilities to sell 
the shares to large established firms (cf. Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
To clarify these comparative perspective, central features of the two types of innovation systems are 
summarised in the following table 1. 
 
Table 1: Types of relations between innovation and finance 
 
 Outsider-dominated Insider-dominated 
Basic finance tool Stocks and cash-flow Loans and cash-flow 
Investor orientation Short-terminism Long-terminism 
Investor expertise Finance-oriented and industry-
specific 
company-specific 
Basic agency conflict Shareholder vs. management Insider vs. management 
Relations between investor
and innovating company 
Loosely coupled; low company-
specific expertise 
Tightly coupled; normally distinct 
company-specific expertise 
Investor strategy Dominance of selection proc-
esses – “exit” 
Dominance of learning processes 
– “voice” 
Venture capital market Key role for high tech innovation Limited influence 
Dominant pattern of innova-
tion 
High-tech/radical Traditional/incremental 
Typical countries U.S.A.:  
shareholder-dominated system 
Germany:  
stakeholder-dominated system 
 
 
3. Dynamics of the financial market  
Recent research – in particular in the field of economic sociology – emphasises the fact that the 
boundaries between the different country-specific innovation systems have begun to blur since the 
1990s due to the internationalisation of the financial markets.6 It furthermore points out that the Anglo-
                                                 
6  A discussion of the factors causing this process of internationalisation and the financial markets changes goes beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g. Deeg, 2009). 
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Saxon forms of corporate financing are asserting themselves while the “insider-dominated“ forms of 
corporate financing and of corporate governance are eroding. According to the research findings, this is 
especially true for Germany, where the dissolution of the traditional networked system of the “Deutsch-
land AG“ is very conspicuous. The researchers speak of a new production regime, which is referred to 
as “financial market capitalism“ (e.g. Kädtler and Sperling, 2002; Beyer and Höpner, 2003; Windolf, 
2005). The networked system of long-term lending by relatively autonomous universal banks tends to 
be replaced by an internationally oriented system based on Anglo-Saxon capital market and corporate 
financing norms, which leads to lasting changes in the system of corporate governance.  
To sum up this discussion (cf. Hirsch-Kreinsen, 1998; Windolf, 2005; Deeg, 2009), the transformation 
processes in several interlinked levels of the system of corporate finance and control can be regarded 
as central features of this new production regime. On the supply side of investors, a changing constella-
tion of actors is discernible: First, mention must be made of the growing influence of new economic insti-
tutions and actors such as various forms of investment funds as well as analysts and rating agencies. 
Second, research findings point to the worldwide greatly increased importance of not publicly regulated 
international forms of capital allocation within the scope of various kinds of private equity funds. Third, 
changes in the structures and strategies of banks are emphasised by research. These result in the in-
creasing importance of profit-oriented and short-term oriented investment banking at the expense of 
long-term oriented lending to firms. In this context, analysts and rating agencies play a key role for the 
investment decisions of the capital providers, as the investors expect an assessment of the risks and 
the future profitability of an investment from them (Windolf, 2005). This change is accompanied by 
changed regulations of credit rating and financing modalities (so-called Basel II-Regulations) which are 
primarily driven by the evaluation of default risk on various forms of debt. This primarily concerns the 
firm’s cost of capital, structure of the balance sheet and variance of cash flow and therefore these regu-
lations strongly influence the financial scope of companies.  
On the demand side of the companies, complementary changes can be observed: To begin with, stud-
ies generally point to  a stronger financial market orientation of the top management of many compa-
nies, which takes effect regardless of the actual influence of the financial market and its actors. The 
prevalence of a general principle that can be described as shareholder value conception of the firm is 
often emphasised (Fligstein, 2001). An important driving force for this phenomenon are the much dis-
cussed stock options and bonus systems that generate massive additional income for managers in the 
case of a successful financial market-oriented reorganisation of the enterprise (cf. Kädtler, 2005). A fur-
ther reason for the prevalence of the shareholder value conception is that a new manager type has be-
gun to predominate in many German industrial enterprises since the 1990s. This new manager type, 
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that is to a great extent recruited from across-the board qualified generalists and from managers from 
the areas of finance and controlling, is increasingly replacing the former type of the technical/scientific 
specialist with a long-standing commitment to the company. In addition, the fluctuation and the mobility 
of the top managers are markedly higher (cf. Freye, 2009). Furthermore, the dissemination of and im-
plementation of new international accounting and financial reporting standards in the companies plays 
an important role for the growing financial market orientation. These standards aim at making an as 
profitable as possible use of the financial reserves of a company. Available research findings show that 
cost structures are thus made more transparent, previous scopes for financing are constricted and profit 
potentials are easier to identify than in the past (cf. Botzem and Quack, 2009). 
Both the supply side of the financial market and the demand side of the companies are linked by the 
system of corporate governance. The complex of structures, interests and practices characterising this 
system has changed considerably. In particular, the emergence of a market for corporate control is em-
phasised, on which businesses are bought or sold. It is generally assumed that this market has “disci-
plining effects“ on businesses because of changed power constellations and potentially possible as well 
as actually impending “hostile takeovers“ (Windolf, 2005: 49). Furthermore, new ownership structures 
are highlighted as central factor for this change. The funds and other institutional investors have a “con-
trol advantage“ over other owners such as minor but also major stockholders, as they often only hold 
limited shares that do not constrain them strategically. Most notably, to assert their interests, they can at 
all times threaten the other shareholders with their exit and the accompanying stock market losses (cf. 
Beyer, 2009). 
The question arises in which way these changes in the financing conditions of a hitherto “insider-
dominated“ system like the German “stakeholder economy” influence the innovation strategies of the 
enterprises. The answer to this question cannot be deduced a priori. On the one hand the changes in 
financial market conditions may lead to constraints on innovation strategies. On the other hand the in-
fluence of new shareholder groups may open new innovation opportunities. To come to a preliminary 
answer the findings of available studies as well as empirical data will be interpreted and summarised in 
the following.  
a) Constraints on the innovative capability of firms 
12 
It is argued that the changes in the financial market conditions are leading to constraints on the innova-
tion capabilities and strategies of enterprises (Deutschmann, 2005, 2008; Lazonick, 2007): For neither 
is the sufficient stability of the financial means guaranteed nor is there sufficient strategic room for ma-
noeuvre. Moreover, because of their lacking contextual knowledge, neither the dominant financial mar-
ket players nor the new financing regulations and instruments are able to adequately assess the risks 
 
  
 
and uncertainties of technical innovations and their preconditions with regard to the corporate structure. 
Accordingly, collective learning processes and knowledge accumulation are seen to be curtailed and 
innovation projects to be reduced to calculable activities. Consequently, technological innovations are 
solely conducted with short-term considerations and the criterion of risk avoidance. 
Empirically this situation is most likely to be encountered in the case of large listed firms with a pro-
nounced financial market orientation. As aggregated data show, there has been a clear trend in large 
German corporations away from bank financing towards more market financing since the beginning of 
the 1990s (cf. Deeg, 2009). Therefore one can assume that massively increased, short-term oriented 
profitability criteria and expectations of external investors lead to an abandonment of innovation activi-
ties or at least to the curtailment of innovation perspectives and of the associated expenses. An empiri-
cal  example for this trend are large pharmaceutical companies that have in the past few years exten-
sively reorganised their value added chains, in particular their research departments. The innovation 
activities of this industry are influenced by a lot of specific factors, in particular the governmental health 
policy. However, there are research findings pointing to the specific influences of financial market condi-
tions (Briken and Kurz, 2006; Kädtler, 2009): For one thing, the innovation processes are streamlined 
and strictly controlled according to financial performance figures or other indicators in order to detect 
undesirable developments at an early stage and to reduce development times. For another thing, the 
linking of innovation processes in the field of pharmaceuticals to criteria of the financial market leads to 
a focus of their innovation strategies on products with particularly good prospects, blockbuster, i.e. pat-
ented key products with a high turnover and profit margin. This innovation focus is based on an ulti-
mately risk-averse preference for limited modifications in the principles of known chemical entities. Par-
allels can be drawn to the automotive industry, where–  under the conditions of a pronounced innovation 
competition – companies are attempting to generate profitability by means of growing but calculable 
innovations (Tylecote and Visintin, 2008: 40ff.). Characteristics of these innovation dynamics are a 
marked rise in the overall R&D since the 1990s, the marked reduction of the development times and the 
massive broadening of the range of products (EFI, 2009). However, these dynamics go along with a 
continuous reduction of the in-house R&D expenditure and a marked rise in external R&D since the 
mid-1990s, whereby the innovation risk in particular regarding the use of new technologies is shifted to 
external suppliers (Jürgens and Sablowski, 2008).  
The takeover of companies by private investment corporations such as private equity funds has similar 
consequences. The strategy of the corporations is directed at a loan-funded investment in companies, 
the utilization of the financial potentials of the taken-over company and a rapid exit at as high a sale 
value as possible – in a nutshell: “invest to sell“ (Klier et al., 2009). According to the available literature 
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(cf. Kamp, 2007), short-term improvements in the efficiency and competitiveness of the enterprises can 
by all means be achieved by these company takeovers but long-term oriented strategies and invest-
ments in research and development are hardly possible anymore. This is shown by a whole range of 
examined taken-over companies, for instance by medium-sized companies from the capital goods in-
dustry: the investors shy away from the financial risk of innovations and are little appreciative of them. 
Moreover, due to the often drastic restructuring measures resulting in the dismantlement of supposedly 
surplus resources and a reduction of business functions to core competences, the organisational room 
for manoeuvre and the personal competencies that are often indispensable for  innovations are lost (cf. 
Lembke, 2008).  
This restrictive situation for innovation projects also affects non-listed companies such as smaller and 
family-owned enterprises. This is due to the generally changed structures of the system of corporate 
financing and of granting of loans (Basel II-Regulations) with its risk-averse and intricate rating and 
evaluation procedures, which subject innovation projects to a more pronounced and systematic eco-
nomic control than in the past (e.g. Belz and Warschat, 2005; Springler, 2007). According to available 
data, this applies in particular to enterprises from traditional sectors, which , due to limited own re-
sources, to a large extent finance innovation activities with tied bank loans; thus in the years 2004-2006 
around 30% of the companies from the food and furniture industries as well as from metal production 
and metalworking financed their innovation plans with loans (in addition to other sources of funding); 
around 21% of the mechanical engineering companies also availed themselves of bank loans (Rammer, 
2009: 41). Furthermore, small and medium-sized enterprises in general are probably subject to these 
restrictions, as their financing is generally largely based on bank loans; as available data show,  bank 
debt as a percentage of balance sheet totals has remained constant for German small and medium en-
terprises since the mid-1990s (Hommel and Schneider, 2003; Heimer et al, 2008; Deeg, 2009). 
A second reason for the restrictive situation is the increasing application of international accounting and 
financial reporting standards which follow the principles of a stronger accountability towards external 
investors and are oriented towards the (listed) company value. Generally speaking, with their emphasis 
on “fair value” accounting principles, these standards reveal the firm’s financial reserves and press for 
the most profitable use of the corporate assets as measured by financial benchmarks. As a result, the 
return expectations of investors are becoming a dominant target figure of the corporate management 
too (Botzem et al., 2007; Deeg, 2009). This can have twofold consequences: For one thing, managers 
often strictly avoid investments in uncertain and risky innovation projects so as not to unnecessarily 
weigh down the balance sheets. For another thing, the growing cost pressure, the introduction of ration-
alisation-based forms of work organisation and of shorter work cycles in the course of ongoing innova-
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tion processes often lead to the already mentioned “good enough-solutions“ and “pseudo solutions“ 
(Grewer et al., 2007: 78). 
A third reason for the growing economic pressure on technological innovation processes are changed 
conceptions of the relevant actors on appropriate profit objectives and changed management principles 
with regard to strategies, methods and organisation concepts. This applies particularly to the organisa-
tion and management concepts often favoured by financial market players, management representa-
tives and analysts, viz. concepts which focus on the so-called core business. As a consequence, the 
previous breadth and diversity of R&D areas and of engineering departments are reduced and central-
ised. Furthermore, the grown and (horizontally and vertically) integrated company structures and their 
adherent resources and knowledge base of many years are often only regarded as cost drivers and are 
dismantled. Hence company structures that were previously characterised by a high degree of integra-
tion of different functions, synergies, knowledge transfer and learning processes between various com-
petence and knowledge areas as well as by organisational “slack“ and redundancies, are streamlined, 
thus abandoning important preconditions for the innovation capability of companies.7 
b) Stabilisation of existing innovation patterns  
The question arises whether one can generally assume this described tight coupling between the finan-
cial market and innovations and hence resulting constraints on the innovation strategies of enterprises. 
There is no clear-cut answer to this question. The available data on the funding methods of companies 
reveals that the enterprises make use of various financing sources for innovation. Thus the influence of 
the financial market and its actors on the corporate strategies is at least put into perspective. Data of the 
years 2004 - 2006 show that the enterprises in Germany use various financing sources for innovations: 
According to the data, many innovating enterprises make exclusive use of internal financial resources 
from ongoing business activities. Just as many enterprises combine internal with external financial 
sources; the exact figures are: 82% of all enterprises use internal financial sources, 41% of the enter-
prises make exclusive use of these while 41% of the enterprises combine them with external financial 
resources (Rammer, 2009: 41). On the one hand, this large share of self-financed investment is not a 
new phenomenon but was already of great importance in the past. On the other hand, there has been a 
marked rise in the share of internal financing since the 1990s (Deeg, 2009: 558). In general, this means 
that enterprises are not often directly dependent on the increasingly restrictive financial market condi-
tions to finance innovations but are at the most loosely coupled with them. This becomes even more 
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apparent from the finding that research-intensive companies (“medium- and high-tech”) in particular use 
internal financing sources, this strategy is pursued by about 95% of these enterprises (ibid.). It can be 
assumed that the enterprises thus wish to secure room for manoeuvre for risky and far-reaching innova-
tions.  
It can also be assumed that under otherwise equal conditions, non-listed companies can secure room 
for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the changed financial market conditions because of their financing and owner-
ship structures which are decoupled from the financial market. Quite large family-run companies are 
often cited as examples for this. These companies have sufficient own capital resources and their pro-
ductivity is generally considered to be very high (e.g. Kamp, 2007). Shareholder loans are a typical form 
of financing in this case. According to the above-mentioned data, approx. 18% of all innovating enter-
prises draw on these to finance their innovations. But listed companies with a distinct financial market 
orientation can also try to maintain their autonomy and pursue innovation strategies independently, pro-
vided that their overall economic situation and their profitability are good.  
Finally, at the level of working processes, the structural conditions of research, development and design 
processes have to be taken into account. Their far-reaching and financial market-driven rationalisation 
would block essential innovation opportunities. As has been convincingly shown by work process stud-
ies (cf. Wolf et al., 1992), it is hardly possible to standardise and formalise innovation work due the ever 
present risks and uncertainties, i.e. the functional logic of these work processes in many cases counter-
acts such attempts. This is also true for the cases in which the innovations processes were effectively 
reorganised as a result of new organisation and management concepts and the introduction of new 
computer-aided systems. These systems have to be well adapted to the respective requirements, a task 
that only the experts on the operative level can accomplish, given the always occurring risks and uncer-
tainties. A precondition for this is the “appropriation“ of the respective systems, i.e. the competent adap-
tation of these systems to the given conditions by their users. Hence, structural barriers to the rationali-
sation of innovation processes and a substantial amount of power on the part of the involved scientists 
and development engineers are the result.  
c) New scope for innovation 
However, the changed financial market conditions also lead to the emergence of new and extended 
scopes for innovation strategies.8 Firstly, mention must be made of investors such as some industrially 
oriented private equity funds that pursue a long-term investment strategy and open up new scopes of 
action for increases in productivity and innovations (Achleitner et al., 2008). Secondly, venture capital 
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that is geared to financing risky product innovations in high-tech sectors plays an important role in this 
context. Apart from the new economy boom of the second half of the 1990s, venture capital in its vari-
ous forms plays a relatively subordinate role for the funding of innovations in Germany in comparison 
especially to the US (BMBF, 2007). Moreover, the volume of venture capital dropped significantly after 
the new economy bubble burst at the beginning of the 2000s. While approx. 2.5 billion Euros of venture 
capital were invested in 2000, this sum only amounted to around 0.75 billion in 2003. For the then fol-
lowing years, however, researchs speak of a “modest revival” of this capital market segment (Deeg, 
2009: 571). Thus the investments in 2005 already amounted to approx. 1.3 bn again and in 2007 to 
about 1 bn Euro (BVK, 2005, 2010). 
In some high-tech sectors, however, venture capital plays a vital role in Germany too. This applies in 
particular to the IT and biotechnology sectors as well as to medical engineering, communication tech-
nology, automation and control as well as feedback control systems. It is estimated that around a fifth to 
a quarter of the R&D expenditure in the biotechnology sector is financed by means of venture capital 
(KfW-Research, 2006: 121; Champenois et al., 2006).9 “Business angels“ represent an often underes-
timated subsegment of the market for venture capital. These are wealthy and highly specialised private 
persons who are able sufficiently to assess the risks and uncertainties of specific innovations and to 
offer the innovating companies not only corresponding financing options but also their advisory skills 
(Carpenter et al., 2003; Tylecote and Ramirez, 2006). Although the available data so far is based on 
estimates, this segment of the capital market too is very small in Germany in an international compari-
son but is extremely significant for certain high-tech companies, especially for research-intensive spin-
offs from the field of science (Fryges et al., 2007). One also has to point to a further subsector of the 
market for venture capital: corporate venture capital. Therewith large-scale enterprises fund innovation 
projects of other smaller companies of interest to them by means of specifically founded companies. 
The financing strategy has a long-term orientation and is normally coupled with consulting services for 
the innovating company. This form of financing can mainly be found in the pharmaceutical sector. De-
spite the current crisis, this small segment of the financial market is evidently growing due to the high 
pressure to innovate in the pharmaceutical industry (FAZ, 2009). 
A basic characteristic of these forms of financing of innovations are the often close personal ties be-
tween the innovating firms and the capital providers. On the basis of their detailed knowledge of a cer-
tain technology field, the investors often have close connections to the company they fund and take an 
active part in the business operations by means of various executive functions they hold within the 
17 
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company. Thus the executive management is more closely controlled by the venture capital givers than 
is the case for other forms of external innovation financing (Rammer, 2009: 37). It is thus worth noting 
that a reconfiguration of the insider system is observable in the segment of venture capital. Its central 
characteristic is the close tie between individual innovating companies and financial market actors and 
the interest of the latter in short-term and high profits which they hope to realise due the influence they 
wield and their intimate knowledge of the technology requirements, risks and uncertainties of innovation 
processes.  
d) Development perspectives  
If one recapitulates the described developments, a growing diversity can be discerned in the German 
innovation system. It is noticeable that the formerly relatively homogeneously structured stakeholder-
dominated system is increasingly differentiating into various subsystems. One can speak of an emerg-
ing “three pillar” system structure: On the one hand, there is a pillar characterised by increasing con-
straints on the companies‘ room for innovations. Especially large listed firms but also a fair number of 
externally financed small and medium-sized enterprises from traditional industrial sectors operate under 
such conditions. On the other hand, there is a pillar featuring companies, mainly from new technological 
fields, that have new scope for innovation. In between these two pillars a sub-system can be found that 
is characterised by the stabilisation of traditional, existing innovation patterns. Here we find a number of 
non-listed and family-owned firms and in particular companies that use their available internal resources 
for innovation activities and are thus unaffected by financial market influences. This three pillar German 
innovation system can be summarised as follows (see table 2 on the next page). 
To be sure, the emerging pillars or subsystems of the German innovation system presented here are 
schematic and are based on preliminary findings. No attempt was made in this article to state more pre-
cisely or even quantify the types of firms falling into each category. This requires much more empirical 
research. 
To sum up, the German innovation system is certainly not totally eroding and converging with the type 
of the Anglo-Saxon outsider-dominated system. One can rather speak of the emergence of a “hybrid“ 
innovation system mixing new and old structures. Although it is becoming more akin to the Anglo-Saxon 
model, in an international comparison it still features a specific configuration. The institutional change 
can thus be conceived as “displacement“, i.e. “foreign“ system elements were integrated into an institu-
tional system without giving up the hitherto existing elements (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). This devel-
opment results in an opening up of the stakeholder-dominated system to new requirements that ensue 
from the international integration and the rapid technological change.  
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Table 2: The emerging “three pillar” German innovation system 
 Pillar 1: Constraints Pillar 2: Stabilisation Pillar 3: New scope 
Prevailing type of
firms 
large listed firms, SMEs non-listed firms, family 
owned, SMEs 
newly founded firms, 
start-ups 
Available firm’s re-
sources 
limited internal, depend-
ent on various forms of 
external financing 
high internal very limited internal re-
sources, dependent  on 
external financing 
Influence of financial 
market conditions 
- market based financial
modes and new inves-
tors 
- Basel II-regulations, 
- International account-
ing and reporting stan-
dards, 
- changing management
concepts and profitability 
norms 
only limited influences, 
high significance of 
firm’s internal financial 
resources 
- specific and focused 
financial market pres-
sure on innovation, 
- significance of new 
financial market seg-
ments: VC and industrial 
oriented PE funds 
Sector/technological 
field 
established, R&D inten-
sive industries, 
low-tech 
established, medium-
tech 
new, high-tech 
Type of innovation 
incremental, restricted, 
more focused 
incremental, radical more or less radical 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
In conclusion, some general insight into the relationship between finance and innovation beyond the 
German context will be provided. For there are as yet few studies - in particular from an institutional 
analysis perspective - on this topic (cf. O’Sullivan, 2005). In a first attempt, the research findings on the 
German system of innovation financing can be generalised in a model of interdependent variables:  
As institutional analysis shows institutions, firms and emerging technologies co-evolve (cf. 
Hollingsworth, 2000; Edquist, 2005). In particular, the institutional conditions of the financial market play 
a key role for the ability of companies to follow long-term strategies as well as for their innovation activi-
ties (cf. Deeg and Jackson, 2007). Therefore, the conditions of the financial market can be considered 
as independent and determining variables regarding the analysis of the course of technological innova-
tions whereas the innovation strategies of enterprises have to be regarded as dependent variables. 
However, different patterns of interaction between the conditions of the financial market and the innova-
tion strategies of companies can be identified. These different patterns are primarily determined by in-
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tervening variables including several factors: First, one has to point to the system of corporate gover-
nance which is characterized by the distinction between de facto publicly-traded companies and family-
run companies. This correlates with the extent to which the management is able to pursue autonomous-
ly financial market-oriented objectives. Second, one has to refer to the available resources of the enter-
prises, which determine to which extent innovation strategies can be pursued autonomously. In this con-
text, the latitude for internal financing decoupled from the financial market is of special importance. 
Third, the company-specific innovative capability (e.g. accumulated experience and management skills) 
also plays a key role. Fourth, the structure of the innovation processes of the companies has to be tak-
en into account. This refers to the technical-functional, organizational and personnel structure of re-
search, development and design processes in intra-company and cross-company (e.g. innovation co-
operations and networks) respect. These interdependencies do not only determine the degree of the 
calculability of the risks and uncertainties of innovations but also influence the autonomy of action of the 
companies vis-à-vis the profitability expectations and requirements of the financial market. 
Finally, following institutional analysis, the relationship between institutional conditions and firm strate-
gies can by no means be described as unidirectional deterministic. For one thing, the institutional condi-
tions do not force the companies into a predetermined direction, in fact the situation is characterised by 
discrepancies; thus, as has been shown, the strategies of external investors can range from short-term 
takeover ambitions to long-term portfolio-oriented investment strategies. For another thing, the interac-
tion among actors and their institutional environment has to be conceptualised as a multi-faceted proc-
ess and it must be taken into account that actors are able to influence and modify institutional regula-
tions (Hollingsworth, 2000: 597). Of decisive importance in this model are therefore the mechanisms 
that act as intermediaries between the structural conditions and the decision-making and action patterns 
of the actors. In the scope of this paper these mechanism haven been preliminary characterised as dif-
ferent patterns of coupling between financial market conditions and company innovation strategies. 
However, which concrete mechanisms take effect still remains an open question. They involve interac-
tion, communication and negotiation processes on the different levels of the whole system and among 
the various involved companies, organisations and other actors. To analyse these much more in-depth 
research is required. 
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